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Caregiving and Work: The Relationship between Labor Market 
Attachment and Parental Caregiving 
Abstract 
There has been much concern over the provision of long-term care and the stresses it imposes on 
the family members who provide that care. However, despite the importance of this issue, it has 
been difficult to assess a causal relationship between caregiving and work. A chief concern is 
that those with weaker attachments to the labor force may be more willing to provide care—
inducing a negative correlation when caregiving itself does not negatively affect employment. In 
this study we draw on 20 years of data from the Health and Retirement Study to examine anew 
the relationship between parental caregiving and work. We use two alternative identification 
strategies: First, we exploit the multiple observations per person existing in our data to estimate a 
fixed effects model for the relationship between caregiving and work. Second, we use unique 
data from the Social Security Administration on earnings histories to control for a woman’s labor 
market behavior long before the potential need to provide care. We find evidence that caregivers 
have at least a strong, and by some measures a stronger, relationship to the labor market than 
non-caregivers.  Rather than labor force attachment, the provision of care appears to be driven 
primarily by parental need and by the availability of alternative caregivers, particularly sisters. 
However, we also find that caregiving has negative long-term effects on employment and 
earnings and can thus be detrimental to the financial well-being of caregivers. 
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The aging U.S. population brings with it a growing need for long-term care. This trend is 
exacerbated by increasing longevity; as individuals live longer, they face heightened risks of 
developing dementia and other disabilities that require long-term care. The cost of this care is 
staggering. Nursing home care averages approximately $90,000 per year, and around the clock 
homecare can cost even more. Because neither Medicare nor supplemental Medicare health 
insurance (Medigap) pays for this care, the financial costs to families can be enormous. Although 
insurance products covering long-term care do exist, few Americans have such policies. As a 
result, the vast majority of long-term care is provided informally by family members, typically 
daughters. This care, too, is costly, with estimates suggesting that the value of informal care 
vastly exceeds that of formal care.   
As the country ages, the burden of this care—on both a micro level and macro level — 
will continue to increase. From the perspective of the caregiver, this burden is measured in terms 
of the emotional stress and physical tasks borne by the caregiver, as well as the opportunity cost 
of the caregiver’s time. Time spent caregiving may come at the expense of time in the labor 
force, the ability to invest in a career and experience wage growth, and the risk of reduced or lost 
retirement benefits. These labor market outcomes may lead the caregivers themselves to be far 
less prepared to finance their own retirement, and thus more dependent on familial and public 
support than they would have been absent such caregiving experience. Given the dominance of 
daughters in caregiving roles, such costs may well portend continued elevated poverty risks 
among elderly widows.1 
Key to understanding this potentially growing risk is understanding the relationship 
between work and caregiving. While simple descriptive statistics suggest that caregivers are less 
likely to work, causality has been difficult to infer. Women who need to provide care may leave 
the labor market to provide this care or even in anticipation of providing care. Conversely, given 
a distribution of attachments to the labor market, caregivers may be drawn from those with 
weaker attachment, lower wages, and spotty employment. If this latter hypothesis is true, then 
                                                          
1 Recent estimates suggest that 60 percent of caregivers are women (AARP and NAC, 2015). With our sample from 
the Health and Retirement Study, we estimate that 46 percent of women will provide care at some point to a parent 
or parent-in-law. 
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the cost of caregiving would be expected to be less than if women with strong labor market 
attachments and a high opportunity cost of their time forego employment to care for a parent.2   
The broader macroeconomic effects of caregiving also depend on the degree to which 
caregiving results in the loss of skilled workers from the formal sector; the more skilled the 
workers who provide care, and the more attached they are to the labor market, the more costly to 
the economy is any time off for caregiving. In contrast to this potential loss, one could also 
imagine that if caregivers are drawn from among those who would not otherwise be participating 
in the labor market, the use of informal care may thus free up potential paid caregivers to do 
other work, perhaps work requiring more medical or health care training. Again, the central 
question is the degree of labor market attachment of those who provide care. Understanding the 
decisions regarding the provision of care to family members can help to ensure that resources are 
allocated efficiently.  
In this paper we take advantage of nearly 20 years of data from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) to assess the relationship between caregiving and labor force outcomes 
for older women. We focus on caregiving for a parent as caregiving for a spouse typically does 
not occur until ages at which women who were working have already retired. Similarly, we focus 
on women because they provide the vast majority of care.  
Obtaining an exogenous measure of attachment to the labor force has been a stumbling 
block for much past work on this topic. Here we take advantage of restricted data to provide 
what is arguably a measure of labor force participation that is less affected by the need to provide 
parental care. Specifically, we use data from Social Security records that provides us with 
information about employment over the woman’s life course. We are thus able to test whether 
employment at various stages of life, and thus labor force attachment prior to care, is predictive 
of later caregiving. For example, one might well imagine that women who leave the labor market 
at younger ages to provide care to children have a less strong attachment later in life. This may 
be because they have chosen careers that allow for more flexibility or because they have a strong 
taste for caregiving.  
We focus our study on women who are observed in the original HRS survey and 
followed for approximately 20 years (or 10 waves)—from 1992 to 2010. We further limit our 
                                                          
2 Note that while spousal caregivers are also predominately female, care for a spouse is typically provided at older 
ages when it is less likely to affect work, although it is still likely to cause substantial emotional and physical stress 
as well as a financial burden.  
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sample to women with living parents or parents-in-law in the first interview and who are not 
providing care at that first measure. While almost 50 percent of our sample is observed to 
provide care for a parent or parent-in-law during the sample period, we find no evidence that 
caregivers are negatively selected from those with lower opportunity cost of time. If anything, 
caregivers have slightly higher levels of schooling, greater earnings, and more work experience.  
Despite this finding, caregiving is negatively related to work, and the result is stronger when 
controlling for past work history, again consistent with the notion that caregivers are positively 
selected. This positive selection suggests that the “costs” of caregiving are potentially even larger 
than if caregivers were randomly selected from the population at risk. From a policy standpoint, 
the provision of alternatives to family care could be productivity enhancing. We also find weak 
evidence that caregiving has long-term effects on the earnings of caregivers and on the likelihood 
of full-time work even after they are no longer providing care. This long-term effect means that 
the costs of caregiving are likely to be far larger than cross-sectional estimates would indicate.   
Our paper is organized as follows. The first section provides some background 
information on the role of informal care in the United States, and Section 2 describes our data in 
detail. In Section 3, we provide an analysis of who in the sample provides care, and section 4 
examines the cost of providing care in terms of employment and earnings. A final section 
concludes.    
I. Background 
The need for long-term care is already pervasive, and the demand is expected to increase 
sharply with the aging of the population. It is estimated that 69 percent of elderly individuals will 
need help with the Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) at some point.3 Of these, one-fifth will 
require sustained assistance over a period of five or more years (Kemper et al., 2006). For the 
vast majority of individuals, this care will come from family members, primarily from daughters 
and wives. Among those in the community receiving help with ADLs, 66 percent receive help 
exclusively from family members, 26 percent receive assistance from both family (informal) and 
paid (formal) care providers, and just 9 percent rely only on formal care (Doty, 2010).4 This 
                                                          
3 The activities of daily living (ADLs) include basic tasks such as bathing, eating, dressing, and toileting. 
4 While some individuals prefer care from family members, a similar fraction would prefer professional care 
(Brown, et al., 2012). 
Preliminary and incomplete. Please do not cite without permission from the authors.
4 
 
reliance on informal care means that family members shoulder much of the burden. According to 
estimates from the AARP Public Policy Institute, in 2009, 42.1 million individuals provided care 
at any given point in 2009, while a significantly greater number—61.6 million—provided care at 
some point over the course of the year (O’Shaughnessy, 2014), indicating that a large fraction of 
this care may be temporary. 
The economic value of this care is immense. Reinhard, Houser, and Choula (2011) 
estimate that the value of informal care in 2009 exceeded $506 billion in 2016 dollars. This 
figure is more than twice the estimated value of formal care and is equivalent to approximately 
19 percent of national health care expenditures (O’Shaughnessy, 2014).5 Arno, Levine and 
Memmott (1999) provide a much smaller, although still substantial, estimate of the value of 
informal care in 1997 at $295 billion (in 2016 dollars). Thus, while there is great concern about 
the level and growth of health care expenditure in the United States, in ignoring the economic 
value of informal care, our official statistics are missing an important component of the true cost, 
and thus underestimating the economic impact of health care costs for the elderly.  
However, as the differences in the costs as predicted by the two studies illustrates, these 
estimates are crude at best. We do not know what caregivers would be doing were they not 
providing care; that is, we do not know the opportunity cost of their time. Whether caregivers are 
leaving highly paid jobs, cutting back on hours at these jobs, or simply foregoing leisure, has 
important implications for estimates of the true cost of informal care. Furthermore, because these 
imputations are calculated by simply multiplying the hours of care provided by an hourly wage, 
we also likely underestimate the true economic cost borne by the caregivers if there are long-
term impacts of caregiving on wages or employment that extend beyond the period of care.  
Finally, although difficult to evaluate, there is no estimate of the psychic cost. Note, however, 
that this psychic cost could be either positive or negative as one might get great satisfaction from 
caring for a loved-one.6  
Prior studies point to a reduction in hours worked associated with caregiving, The 
National Association of Insurance Companies / American Council of Life Insurers reports that 
                                                          
5 According to the National Health Policy Forum (O’Shaughnessy, 2014), Americans spent $219 billion on paid 
long-term care for the elderly in 2012. In that year, this expenditure represented 9.3 percent of all U.S. personal 
health care spending. The value of informal care is not included in these figures. 
6 Amirkhanyan and Wolf (2006) find that non-caregiving children of infirmed parents report more depressive 
symptoms than children who are providing care as measured by CES-D scores.    
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10 percent of caregivers cut back on hours worked because of the demands of caregiving. In 
addition, an estimated 6 percent of caregivers left paid work entirely, again losing benefits, as 
well as likely taking a hit to wages should they return to the labor force after a spell of 
caregiving. Seventeen percent of caregivers took a leave of absence. These reductions in work 
would likely affect benefits such as health insurance and / or a decline in wage growth, as well as 
earnings and potentially future earnings as those busy with caregiving may have reduced 
probabilities of promotions. Finally, 4 percent turn down promotions, directly reducing wage 
growth in the near term and perhaps future opportunities for promotions as well. This latter 
figure is suggestive of a broader phenomenon in which caregivers invest less intensively in a job 
because of other responsibilities. They may do so in less obvious ways than by turning down 
promotions, such as by not volunteering for important / high visibility assignments, not putting in 
overtime to ensure that projects are done in a timely manner, or simply not accepting extra 
responsibility in the anticipation of greater wage increases in the future. 
Complete departures from the labor force are relatively easily documented, and many 
researchers have examined labor market responses on this extensive margin (Ettner, 1996; 
Heitmueller, 2007; Lo Sasso 2006; Bolin et al., 2008; Carmichael, et al, 2010; Van Houtven et 
al. 2013). It is far more difficult to measure a reduction in effort on the job, or even often a 
reduction in hours.  When examining both the intensive and extensive margin jointly, Johnson 
and Lo Sasso (2006) find that those women who provide care to an elderly parent reduce hours 
of work by approximately 40 percent.   
II. Data 
Our data come from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is a panel study 
that is approximately representative of the United States population ages 51 or older and their 
spouses or partners. The original cohort consists of those individuals born in 1931-1941 who 
were first interviewed in 1992 and have been interviewed biennially thereafter. In 1998, three 
additional cohorts consisting of older and younger groups were added to the study to make the 
sample approximately representative of the target population. Refresher cohorts were added in 
2004 and 2010 to fill in the population ages 51-56 as respondents aged out of that bracket. The 
survey continues to interview all respondents biennially, until they die.   
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We focus our study on women who are the primary caregivers. Because we wish to 
observe potential caregivers over as long a window as possible, we limit our attention to those 
who were interviewed in 1992 and followed through 2010,7 and in order to assess the change in 
labor force participation surrounding the onset of caregiving, we restrict our sample to those who 
were not initially providing care but who have at least one living parent or parent-in-law.8  With 
these restrictions our sample consists of 1,557 women and 15,557 person years of observations.   
Our central variable of interest is a measure of whether the respondent provided care. 
Caregiving in our sample is defined as an affirmative response to the question:  
Did you (or your husband / wife / partner) spend a total of 100 or more hours (since the previous 
wave / in the last two years) helping your (parents / mother / father) with basic personal 
activities like dressing, eating and bathing?  
While the question asks about total care for the respondent-couple, follow-up questions 
allow us to identify the hours provided by each individual. The 1992 and 1994 interviews asked 
about assistance provided over the previous 12 months while later interviews asked about care in 
the time between waves or the previous two years. There is no clear way to correct for the 
difference in the length of time so we simply ignore this inconsistency.9 In addition, in all 
interview waves except 1994, respondents were asked to report any caregiving that exceeded a 
total of 100 hours over the period. In 1994, the cut-off point was 50 hours. We “force” a 100 
hour minimum by setting to zero any report of 99 or fewer hours.  
III. Who are the Caregivers 
Descriptive Analysis:  The means of a set of demographic and economic variables for our 
sample are presented in Table 1. Using one observation per individual, we show the means and 
standard errors for the sample as a whole and separately for those women who ever provided 
care during the sample period and those who did not. Approximately one-half (46 percent) of our 
                                                          
7 We include spouses / partners of age-eligible respondents even if they are outside of the 51-61 age range. Because 
those outside this range have zero individual weight, we use household weights in all weighted analyses.  
8 In 1992, respondents were first asked if they had a living parent, if so, they were asked about caregiving to parents 
and / or parents-in-law.  If there was no living parent, the questions about caregiving were not asked. Because we 
selected on having parents or parents-in-law and NOT providing care, we currently have a sample that consists of 
those with living parents.  We will rectify this situation in our revision, selecting on living parents or parents-in-law 
and NOT caregiving in the second wave of the survey.  
9 The median time between interviews is two years, so the questions generally refer to caregiving over a period of 
approximately two years. 
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sample provides care at some point after 1992. The average age of our respondents is 52.2, 78 
percent is married, they average 12.6 years of schooling and 3.34 children. Just 16 percent of the 
sample is non-white. The average household income is more than $80,000. The average years of 
labor market experiences is 22.5 and the average tenure on the longest job is just more than 12 
years. Our respondents average approximately three siblings (1.5 sisters) and three siblings-in-
law (1.5 sisters-in-law).  
Comparing those who provide care with those who do not, the results cast doubt on the 
hypothesis that caregivers have a weaker attachment to the labor market. Caregivers have 
slightly more years of schooling, are more likely to be employed, and have higher earnings 
conditional on employment (all at the 5 or 10 percent level). They also have significantly more 
experience (at a 1 percent level) and more tenure on the longest job (at a 5 percent level).  
However, we do see expected differences in the “risk” of providing care. Caregivers have more 
living parents and parents-in-law, they have fewer siblings and fewer sisters to provide an 
alternative source of care. Interestingly, there are no significant differences in alternative 
caregivers on the in-law side (siblings-in-law or sisters-in-law). A simple table of means is 
obviously not the end of the story, so a careful econometric analysis is still necessary. Yet from 
this first glance, it appears that the strongest predictors of providing are from the risk exposure 
point of view rather than because the caregivers are “available” to provide care in terms of 
having a lower opportunity cost of time.  
Perhaps our best measure of labor force attachment is comes from the Social Security 
records. Here we see that caregivers average 37.9 quarters of coverage between ages 25 and 44, 
compared to 34.4 for noncaregivers (the difference is significant at the 5 percent level), again 
evidence that caregivers are not selected from among those with weaker attachment. We can also 
look at covered earnings for the same period of time. Conditional on having positive earnings, 
caregivers average $5,110 per quarter while noncaregivers average $4,800 (difference significant 
at the 10 percent level). As a consequence of their higher labor force attachment in their prime 
working years, caregivers can also expect greater Social Security benefits (a higher principal 
insurance amount) if they claim at the normal retirement age.10 These results are not sensitive to 
                                                          
10 The expected PIA figures are taken from the restricted version of the Prospective Social Security Wealth 
Measures of Pre-retirees data. See Kapinos et al., 2016, for a discussion of how these variables are derived. 
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the 25 to 44 age window: We find the same pattern when we shrink the window to cover ages 25 
to 34 or  broaden it to include ages 25 to 64.    
Figures 1a and 1b provide more detail on caregiving.  Figure 1a shows the fraction of the 
sample that reports caregiving at each interview. (Recall that none of the respondents is 
providing care at the first interview.) The most likely interview for caregiving is 1998, with 13 
percent reporting caregiving in this wave. Only 5 percent of the sample reported caregiving in 
1994, suggesting that for the majority of individuals in our sample, work behavior in 1992 is far 
removed from any caregiving responsibilities.  Figure 1b shows reported hours of caregiving by 
wave, both for the entire sample (blue bars) and conditional on providing care (red bars).  Again, 
1998 shows the greatest number of hours of care at 105 and very few hours of care reported prior 
to that time. However, care is most intensively provided in 2002 with a conditional mean of 
1,086 hours.  
Figures 2a and 2b, again illustrating caregiving by wave, show the cumulative probability 
of caregiving and the mean cumulative hours of care.  By the end of the survey (2010), 46 
percent of the sample has reportedly provided care to an elderly parent or parent-in-law and the 
mean cumulative hours of care is 672 hours. Conditional on providing care, the mean number of 
hours is 1,456.  Mean hourly earnings in our sample is approximately $19; at this rate, the 672 
hours represent a value of $12,768.  
Table 2 provides some more detail on the amount of care provided for those providing 
some amount of care. Conditional on providing care, the mean number of hours over the 10 
survey waves is 1,451. This number is large on its own, but is particularly impressive in that the 
average number of interviews at which individuals report care is less than two.  The median 
number of hours is substantially smaller at 550, though note that this is equivalent to a full-time 
(40 hours a week) job for one-quarter of a year. (However, an unfortunate limitation of the data 
is that we have no way of knowing how these hours were distributed throughout the interval 
between interviews.) The vast majority of this care (1,451 hours) is provided to the respondent’s 
own parents with only a small amount (116 hours) provided to parents-in-law. 
The extraordinarily large difference between the amount of care to own parents and that 
to parents-in-law suggests that there might be a different mechanism driving the two types of 
care. Table 3 shows the means of a subset of variables from Table 1, separately for those 
providing care to a parent and those providing care to a parent-in-law, alongside those not 
Preliminary and incomplete. Please do not cite without permission from the authors.
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providing any care. (Individuals who provide care to both are included in each subsample.)  The 
asterisks indicate whether the values in each of the types of caregiving columns are significantly 
different from the “no care” group. As seen initially, for those providing care to a parent, there 
does not appear to be negative selection on labor market behavior—caregivers have more 
schooling, more work experience, and higher earnings (conditional on working) than do 
noncaregivers. This pattern does not hold when looking at caregivers for parents-in-law: These 
women do not have significantly more years of schooling than noncaregivers, and they actually 
have fewer years of experience and lower earnings conditional on working, than do 
noncaregivers. Social Security earnings and employment figures reveal the same pattern. While 
those who care for their own parent have, on average, more covered quarters of employment and 
greater quarterly Social Security earnings than noncaregivers, we find that those caring for a 
parent-in-law are not statistically distinguishable from the non-caregiver population along these 
dimensions. 
Yet despite their apparent weaker attachment to the labor force, caregivers for parents-in-
law do appear to be better off in terms of socioeconomic status. They have greater household 
income and wealth (although the latter, while large, at close to $100,000 greater than 
noncaregivers, is not significantly different from zero), are less likely to be non-white or 
Hispanic. They are also younger, more likely to be married, and unsurprisingly have more living 
parents-in-law. Thus, although the sample size is small so statistical significance difficult to 
attain, the results seem to suggest that a different selection mechanism for own parents (which 
appears to be based on the need to provide care more so than the availability), differs from 
selection into parent-in-law care where availability (opportunity cost of time) might play a larger 
role.  
Regression Analysis: The patterns evidenced in the means are intriguing. They suggest 
that caregivers are not negatively selected and thus that caregiving could have significant costs in 
terms of foregone wages or benefits. In this section, we revisit these results in a multivariate 
regression context wherein we can control simultaneously for a number of individual 
characteristics. 
In Table 4, we first examine the probability of providing care as a simple linear 
probability model. We stack all observations for our individuals and correct the standard errors 
for clustering. The multiple observations per respondent allow us to control for age as well as 
Preliminary and incomplete. Please do not cite without permission from the authors.
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year effects.11 We control for age, schooling, experience, and tenure on the longest job, all 
measured as of the first wave to avoid the possibility that these measures are affected by 
caregiving decisions, and current health status.12 We also include measures proxying the 
likelihood that they have an elderly parent in need of care: number of living parents (parents-in-
law), number of siblings (siblings-in-law), number of sisters (sisters-in-law), age of oldest parent 
(parent-in-law). Finally we include standard socioeconomic characteristics including race / 
ethnicity, marital status, household wealth, spousal employment, and spousal income. Because 
caregiving for a parent / parent-in-law requires a living parent / parent-in-law, we drop 
respondents from the regression when they no longer have a parent or parent-in-law alive. We 
are left with 8,501 observations for our 1,557 women.  
In simple OLS, contrary to expectations that individuals who provide care have only 
weak attachments to the labor force, we find that those who provide care have significantly more 
experience at the start of the sample period (1992). Approximately 10 percent of our sample is 
providing care at any given survey date, and an additional 10 years of experience (slightly less 
than one-half the average level of experience) corresponds to a 2 percent point, or 20 percent 
increase, in the likelihood of caring for a parent or parent-in-law. We also find strong significant 
effects for the number of sisters, with each sister reducing the probability of providing care by 1 
percentage points or 10 percent. Note that siblings themselves do not have a significant effect on 
caregiving, only sisters. The age of the oldest parent / parent-in-law (proxying need) also has a 
significant effect on the likelihood of providing care with an additional 10 years of parent / 
parent-in-law age increasing the probability by 5 percentage points, or 50 percent.   
Given the statistics in Table 1b, we repeat this OLS analysis separately with parent care 
and parent-in-law care as the dependent variable. Because the majority of observations are care 
to a parent, the results from looking at parental caregiving alone are nearly identical to those for 
a parent or parent-in-law: We continue to see a positive and significant effect of experience on 
parental care, a negative effect of sisters, and a positive effect of parental age. However, for 
                                                          
11 In previous work on caregiving, we examined cohort differences in caregiving and found that more recent cohorts 
were more likely to provide care than earlier cohorts even conditional on a number of factors including the presence 
of parents / parents-in-law (Fahle and McGarry, forthcoming).  We cannot control simultaneously for age, year, and 
cohort effects and because our focus here is on work, we chose to include year dummy variables to capture 
differences in labor markets (unemployment, real wages) over time. Controlling for birth cohort in lieu of year leads 
to similar results for the coefficients on our variables of interest.  
12 In our reported results, we include only a linear measure of age. The results are similar using either single-year or 
five-year age category indicators. 
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caregiving to parents-in-law, neither experience nor sisters is significantly different from zero—
but the age of the parent-in-law does has a significant effect. A 10 year increase in the age of the 
parent-in-law, increases the probability of caring by 1 percentage point on a mean probability of 
approximately 4 percentage points or roughly 25 percent. There is also an effect of being 
nonwhite, with nonwhites having a significantly lower probability of caring for a parent-in-law 
relative to whites, the effect, while significantly different from zero at just a 10 percent level is 
relatively large, decreasing the likelihood of providing care by approximately 50 percent.  
There are likely to be important differences in the strength of attachment to the labor 
force that affect the decision to provide care.  To control for this attachment we try two separate 
mechanisms. First, we undertake a fixed effects analysis. A downside of this specification is that 
those variables that were previously significantly different from zero, namely experience in 1992 
and the number of sisters, and race, are not identified. Therefore, as an alternative, we also 
include additional specifications that control for differences in labor force attachment by 
including measures taken from Social Security records, reflecting participation at younger ages. 
These variables include the number of Social Security covered quarters between ages 25 and 44 
and average Social Security quarterly earnings over the same ages (individuals with zero covered 
quarters are assigned zero quarterly earnings). The remaining columns in Table 4 repeats the 
analysis with these measures entered alternately for any caregiving, parental caregiving, and 
caregiving for parents-in-law.  
In the fixed effect analysis, none of the previously significant variables is significantly 
different from zero. In our analysis with the Social Security variables, we find none of these 
additional measures to be significant. After controlling for experience measured in 1992, which 
remains an important positive predictor of care to parents and parents/parents-in-law, these 
measures of work history earlier in life appear to provide little additional predictive power.  
IV. Cost of Caregiving 
Short term: Certainly caregiving can result in significant psychological stress and perhaps 
physical stress involved in assistance with activities of daily living. Here, however, we focus on 
the cost in terms of labor market outcomes. In descriptive statistics in Table 1a we found that 
caregivers did not appear to work less than noncaregivers, at least prior to the onset of care, and 
in fact, seemed to have a stronger attachment to the labor force. We begin our analysis of the cost 
Preliminary and incomplete. Please do not cite without permission from the authors.
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of care by examining changes in labor force behavior that are coincident with the start of 
caregiving. We then look at the longer-term effects of caregiving on work.  
Table 5a shows that change in employment status at the point when caregiving begins. 
Here we take just those women who report caregiving for the first time in a particular wave. The 
rows defined on the left-hand-side report their status in the previous wave: working full-time, 
working part-time (less than 30 hours), not-working, and the columns show their status after the 
transition to caregiving in each of the same categories.  We see that 17 percent of those who 
were working full-time in the period before caregiving are not working, and another 11 percent 
are working part-time; 72 percent, remain employed full-time. The corresponding change in 
hours agrees with this change in employment. The average change in hours for those leaving 
full-time work is 41 hours, and the loss in earnings is substantial, approximately $34,000. These 
numbers would seem to imply that caregivers leave employment. However, Table 5b shows the 
corresponding changes over a two-year period for those who do not provide care; the numbers 
here are nearly identical with 14 percent of those working full-time leaving employment 
completely, a decline of 42 hours on average and a loss of $33,754. Thus, it appears that 
departures from the labor force for caregivers are in line with the non-caregiving population and 
likely simply due to the age of the sample that is approaching retirement.   
However, there are a number of ways in which caregivers differ from those who do not 
provide care and for a more detailed look we turn to regression analysis. Our left hand side 
variable is first an indicator variable for whether the respondent is working at all. We then look 
at hours worked, and finally at annual earnings, both unconditional and conditional on working. 
As before, we use fixed effect analyses and controls for labor force attachment from the Social 
Security record. Our primary variable of interest is the effect of caregiving.13 We also include, as 
regressors, the standard predictors of work: age, schooling, race / ethnicity, marital status, 
number of children, poor health, experience at the first interview, tenure on the longest job at the 
first interview.14 Tables 6a reports the results.  
                                                          
13 We use only a 0/1 measure of caregiving because the hours measure conflates the number of hours per week and 
the number of weeks over a two-year period. While we would like to investigate the role of intensity as well as the 
role of persistency, we are unable to do so with these data.  
14 Again, our reported results include a linear control for age, but the results are similar when we control for age 
using single-year or five-year age category indicators. 
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When looking at the relationship between caregiving and work, we find that caregiving 
reduces the probability of work by approximately 4.6 percentage points. At a mean of 0.58, this 
corresponds to an 8 percent decline. Other control variables have the expected effects: There is a 
clear decline in work with age and the probability is lower for married women.  Experience at the 
first interview is positively correlated with work, but tenure on the longest job has no effect.   
As noted previously, there are obviously unobserved individual effects that may be 
correlated with the work and with caregiving. Industriousness, for example, could be positively 
correlated with both. Alternatively, some measure of family ties or desire to provide care may be 
correlated positively with caregiving itself but negatively correlated with work. This latter 
possibility could manifest itself in a woman taking time off to care for a child earlier in life, 
perhaps investing less intensively in her career. When we use a fixed effects analysis, the 
magnitude of the effect of caregiving declines by roughly one-third but is still negative and 
significantly different from zero. The results with the Social Security controls added are similar 
to those without. The negative association between caregiving and work appears larger though 
not significantly so, and the Social Security variables themselves add little additional predictive 
power.  
Similarly, caregiving reduces hours worked by 1.7 hours, or 8.5 percent in OLS and by a 
similar amount in the fixed effects version. Again, the effects of other variables are as expected. 
If we look only at the hours worked among those employed, caregiving is not significantly 
different from zero in the OLS regression but is in the fixed effects version, with a magnitude 
only slightly smaller than for the unconditional specification. As with work, the addition of the 
Social Security variables has little effect on the association between caregiving and hours. Unlike 
in the case of work, however, we do find that average quarterly covered earnings positively 
predicts hours worked. In our final set of equations, those for annual earnings, we do not find a 
significant effect of caregiving in either the OLS or fixed effects versions. In this case, the 
addition of the Social Security measures does meaningfully increase the predictive power of the 
specifications, and we find that historical quarterly covered earnings is a significant positive 
predictor of current annual earnings. 
 
Long term: The change in labor market factors associated with caregiving is unsurprising. 
We now look to see whether there are long-term effects of this caregiving. In Table 7, we 
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compare the status in 1992 with that in 2010 for caregivers and noncaregivers. Values that are 
significantly different are denoted with asterisks. Some of those termed caregivers, provided 
assistance early in the period, reporting care at the 1994 interview for example, while others 
provided it much later, as late as 2010. (Recall, because of our selection criteria, none of the 
“caregivers” were providing care at the 1992 interview or in the preceding year.) In comparing 
the two groups, the most apparent is the difference in the change in full-time work and earnings 
for caregivers and noncaregivers. Caregivers have a significantly larger decline in the probability 
of working full-time, of 44 percent compared to 37 percent for noncaregivers.  Caregivers also 
have a significantly larger decline in earnings than noncaregivers: $26,080 per year compared to 
$18,499 for noncaregivers.  While the difference is consistent with caregiving having an effect 
on work, the causality is not necessarily implied.  There is also a larger decline in household 
income for caregivers, and a much smaller increase in net wealth. Although neither difference is 
significantly different from zero, they do potentially point to a worsening financial situation for 
caregiving families.   
 
Regression: We also analyze these longer-term effects of caregiving in a similar 
regression context. The left hand side variable here is first work at the end of the period of 
observation (2010) and then earnings at the end of the period of observation. In each case, we 
include initial conditions in the regression, work in 1992 and earnings in 1992. We are thus 
looking at the change in employment and earnings as a function of caregiving, but allowing for a 
more flexible form. In addition, we include as regressors age (in categories), schooling, race / 
ethnicity, marital status, number of children, poor health, experience at the first interview, tenure 
on the longest job at the first interview. We cannot use a fixed effects analysis because there is 
only one observation per respondent. Our focus is on the variable measuring whether the 
respondent ever provided care. The results are presented in Table 8. 
We see that work in 1992 is significantly and positively related to work in 2010 as is 
initial experience, while age and fair / poor health are negatively related. There is no effect of 
caregiving on final work status. When we turn to earnings, whether conditional or unconditional, 
work in 1992 continues to have a positive effect, while age and health status have negative 
effects. However, here caregiving has significantly negative effects in all specifications, and the 
magnitude of the effects are large. Conditional on positive earnings, having ever provided care 
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reduces annual earnings by over $12,400, or 51 percent. These conclusions are virtually 
unchanged with the addition of our Social Security measures of work history. Again, we find that 
while the number of covered quarters is not associated with either of these outcomes, historical 
quarterly earnings positively predict wage growth between 1992 and 2010. 
V. Conclusion 
The retirement of the baby boom and the aging of the population more generally present 
a number of challenges. Two of the most pressing are the need to care for the elderly, and the 
need to retain a large and productive workforce when this large cohort reaches retirement age. 
These two issues are interrelated in that workers, particularly women, may need to reduce their 
labor force participation in order to care for an elderly parent. In this paper, we examined the 
relationship between work and caregiving, taking advantage of the Health and Retirement Study 
that allows us to examine caregiving and labor force participation over as long a period as 20 
years, and which (through restricted data) provides access to Social Security earnings records 
and thus a lifetime measure of labor force participation.  
We find that caregiving is quite prevalent. We find that nearly half of our sample of 
women in their 50s and early 60s with living parents / parents-in-law, provide care to these 
parents / parents-in-law at some point during our window of observation. We also find that 
contrary to expectations, these caregivers are not drawn from the ranks of those with a weak 
attachment to the labor force, but rather tend to have more experience at the start of our period of 
observation. Despite this relationship, we do find negative effects of caregiving on work, and 
importantly, in the long-run, negative effects on earnings for those who remain employed. 
These results suggest that caregiving, for even a relatively short period of time (say less 
than two years) can have negative effects on long-term well-being. This finding is particularly 
relevant given the high poverty rates prevalent among unmarried elderly women.   
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Figure 1a. Probability of Caregiving by Wave (n=15,570) 
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Figure 2a. Ever Caregiving by Wave (n=15,570) 
 






































































1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Hours Hours | Ever Caregiving
Preliminary and incomplete. Please do not cite without permission from the authors.
20 
 








 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Ever Provided Caregiving 0/1 0.46 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age 52.16* 0.12 51.92 0.17 52.37 0.17 
Married 0.78 0.01 0.79 0.02 0.77 0.01 
Years of Schooling 12.61* 0.07 12.76 0.11 12.49 0.10 
Number of Children 3.34 0.05 3.31 0.07 3.37 0.07 
Nonwhite 0.16** 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.14 0.01 
Hispanic 0.08* 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.01 
Fair/poor Health 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.14 0.01 
Work Full-time 0.49* 0.01 0.51 0.02 0.47 0.02 
Work Part-time 0.20 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.20 0.01 
Not Working 0.31* 0.01 0.29 0.02 0.33 0.02 
Earnings (if working) 31,631** 772 33,370 1166 30,025 1018 
Husband works (if married) 0.79 0.01 0.81 0.02 0.78 0.02 
Husband’s earning (if working) 58,564 1849 59,673 2414 57,548 2769 
HH Income 80,878 1842 83,847 2659 78,304 2551 
Median Income 69,322 NA 71,978 NA 66,418 NA 
HH Wealth 351,756 18048 360,242 28847 344,399 22594 
Median Wealth 191,531 NA 194,619 NA 187,360 NA 
Experience 22.49*** 0.30 23.49 0.43 21.62 0.41 
Tenure Current Job 10.67 0.28 11.09 0.41 10.28 0.38 
Tenure Longest Job 12.33** 0.22 12.82 0.33 11.90 0.30 
Num covered quarters 25-44 36.0** 0.70 37.9 1.03 34.4 0.94 
Average quarterly earnings 25-44 4.94* 0.08 5.11 0.13 4.80 0.11 
Expected Insured status at NRA 0.88 0.01 0.89 0.01 0.88 0.01 
Expected PIA at NRA 1.56** 0.03 1.62 0.04 1.51 0.04 
Any Parent / Parent‐in‐law Alive 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Any Parent Alive 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Any Parent-in-law Alive 0.39*** 0.01 0.45 0.02 0.34 0.02 
Number of Living Parents 1.27*** 0.01 1.32 0.02 1.23 0.01 
Number of Living Parent-in-law 0.60*** 0.02 0.69 0.03 0.52 0.03 
Number of Siblings 2.95** 0.06 2.80 0.09 3.08 0.09 
Number of Sisters 1.53*** 0.04 1.39 0.06 1.65 0.06 
Number of Siblings-in-law 2.87 0.07 2.88 0.10 2.87 0.09 
Number of Sisters-in-law 1.51 0.04 1.53 0.07 1.50 0.06 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2. Summary over 10 Waves Among Those Ever Providing Care  (N=723 ) 
 Mean Std Err 
Care to Parents and Parents-in-law   
   Total hours provided 1450.95 82.14 
25 percentile 200 
 50 percentile 550 
 75 percentile 1890 
    Total number of interviews at which they said they provided care 1.77 0.04 
   
Care to Parents    
   Fraction providing care to parents 0.91  
   Total hours provided 1553.43 89.19 
25 percentile 200  
50 percentile 600  
75 percentile 2016  
   Total number of interviews at which they said they provided care 1.82 0.05 
   
Care to Parents-in-law   
   Fraction providing care to parents-in-law 0.18  
   Total hours provided 1452.58 175.84 
25 percentile 200 
 50 percentile 620 
 75 percentile 1812 
    Total number of interviews at which they said they provided care 2.18 0.11 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics (Weighted) 






  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Ever Provided Caregiving 0/1 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age 52.17 0.20 49.76*** 0.35 52.37 0.17 
Married 0.77 0.02 0.96*** 0.02 0.77 0.01 
Years of Schooling 12.96** 0.12 12.70 0.26 12.49 0.10 
Number of Children 3.28 0.08 3.13 0.12 3.37 0.07 
Nonwhite 0.12* 0.01 0.02*** 0.01 0.14 0.01 
Hispanic 0.05 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.09 0.01 
Fair/poor Health 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.14 0.01 
Work Full-time 0.49 0.02 0.47 0.04 0.47 0.02 
Work Part-time 0.21 0.01 0.24 0.04 0.20 0.01 
Not Working 0.30 0.02 0.29 0.04 0.33 0.02 
Earnings (if working) 34,080* 1,349.73 28,136 2,256.54 30,025 1,018.00 
Husband works (if married) 0.81 0.02 0.91*** 0.02 0.78 0.02 
Husband’s earnings (if 
working) 63,238 3734 62,378 2598 57,548 2769 
HH Income 86,468 4149.15 95,330* 4368.77 78,304 2551.00 
Median Income 71,052 -- 85,725 -- 66,418 -- 
HH Wealth 391,475 37,063.90 435,560 48,512.62 344,399 22,594.32 
Median Wealth 192,611 -- 229,682 -- 187,360 -- 
Experience 23.51*** 0.42 21.00 0.55 21.62 0.41 
Tenure Current Job 10.68 0.42 9.22 0.78 10.28 0.38 
Tenure Longest Job 12.62* 0.34 10.51 0.60 11.90 0.30 
Num covered quarters 25-44 38.2*** 1.08 34.4 2.48 34.4 0.94 
Average quarterly earnings 25-
44 5.16** 0.13 4.71 0.30 4.8 0.11 
Expected Insured status at 
NRA 0.89 0.01 0.87 0.03 0.88 0.01 
Expected PIA at NRA 1.61* 0.04 1.72** 0.11 1.51 0.04 
Any Parent / Parent‐in‐law 
Alive 
1 0 1 0 1 0 
Any Parent Alive 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Any Parent-in-law Alive 0.41** 0.02 0.97*** 0.01 0.41** 0.02 
Number of Living Parents 1.32*** 0.02 1.33* 0.04 1.23 0.01 
Number of Living Parent-in-
law 0.64*** 0.03 1.24*** 0.04 0.52 0.03 
Number of Siblings 2.61*** 0.10 2.75 0.18 3.08 0.09 
Number of Sisters 1.30*** 0.06 1.32* 0.11 1.65 0.06 
Number of Siblings-in-law 2.74 0.11 2.71 0.18 2.87 0.09 
Number of Sisters-in-law 1.46 0.07 1.25 0.11 1.50 0.06 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.  Linear Probability Model on Probability of Care Giving 
  Respondent provided any care to 
  parent / parent-in-law parent parent-in-Law 
  OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
    
  
   
 Age -0.001 -0.00019 -0.002 -0.001 -0.00034 0.001 -0.001 -0.00067 -0.006 
 (0.001) (0.0012) (0.011) (0.001) (0.0012) (0.010) (0.001) (0.0011) (0.016) 
High school 1992 0.011 0.00070  0.010 -0.0026  -0.006 -0.0067 
 
 (0.013) (0.014)  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.019) (0.021)  
Some college 1992 0.002 -0.0024  0.004 -0.0018  -0.010 -0.0053  
 (0.014) (0.015)  (0.014) (0.014)  
(0.021) (0.022) 




 (0.015) (0.015)  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.023) (0.024)  
Experience 1992 0.002*** -0.00076  0.002*** -0.00068  0.000 -0.00012  
 (0.001) (0.00067)  (0.001) (0.00066)  (0.001) (0.00068)  
Tenure longest job 1992 -0.001 0.0014**  -0.001 0.0012*  0.000 0.00030  
 (0.001) (0.00062)  (0.001) (0.00060)  (0.001) (0.00058)  
#living parents -0.002 0.00013 -0.009 -0.012 0.00020 0.008  0.000062  
 (0.009) (0.00028) (0.014) (0.009) (0.00027) (0.020)  (0.00027)  
#living parents-in-law 0.009 -0.0010 -0.003  -0.00083  -0.009 -0.0017 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.0019) (0.014)  (0.0018)  
(0.011) (0.0019) (0.022) 
#siblings 0.001 -0.00036 -0.002 -0.000 -0.013 0.000 0.002 0.0092 -0.018** 
 (0.003) (0.0087) (0.008) (0.003) (0.0085) (0.009) (0.003) (0.0098) (0.008) 
#sisters -0.010** 0.016* 0.002 -0.008* 0.018** -0.004 -0.006 -0.0099 0.027** 
 (0.005) (0.0080) (0.014) (0.005) (0.0072) (0.015) (0.005) (0.011) (0.013) 
#siblings-in-law -0.002 0.0026 -0.009 -0.001 0.000058 -0.015 -0.003 0.0021 0.021 
 (0.003) (0.0033) (0.009) (0.003) (0.0031) (0.009) (0.004) (0.0034) (0.016) 
#sisters-in-law 0.002 -0.013** 0.015 0.002 -0.010** 0.022* -0.003 -0.0044 -0.034 
 (0.005) (0.0052) (0.013) (0.005) (0.0047) (0.013) (0.006) (0.0054) (0.023) 
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Covered Quarters 25-44 -0.0025 
 





(0.0032)   (0.0033) 


















 (0.001) (0.00076) (0.002)    
 
 
 Age of oldest parent  0.005*** 0.0045*** -0.004    
    (0.001) (0.00084) (0.004)    
Age of oldest p-i-l     0.001** 0.0015** -0.001 
       (0.001) (0.00062) (0.001) 
Nonwhite (0/1) -0.002 0.0025  0.005 0.0081  -0.022* -0.017  
 (0.013) (0.014)  (0.013) (0.014)  (0.012) (0.013)  
Hispanic (0/1) -0.024 -0.021  -0.010 -0.0075  -0.022 -0.022  
 (0.016) (0.016)  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.019) (0.020)  
Married (0/1) -0.009 -0.0068 0.012 -0.009 -0.010 0.022 0.013 0.017 0.009 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.013) (0.014) (0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.021) 
2nd wealth quartile 0.001 0.0034 -0.001 0.006 0.0094 0.005 -0.006 -0.015 -0.009 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
3rd wealth quartile -0.008 -0.0038 0.002 -0.004 -0.0000074 0.013 -0.009 -0.014 -0.026 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
4th wealth quartile -0.009 -0.0027 -0.002 -0.012 -0.0032 -0.000 0.002 -0.0031 -0.011 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023) 
Spouse employed (0/1) -0.008 -0.0091 -0.004 -0.018* -0.019** -0.012 0.003 -0.0016 -0.013 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.0098) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) 
Spousal income 0.000 0.0000083 0.000 0.000 0.000012 0.000 0.000 0.000065 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000074) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000068) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00011) (0.000) 
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Constant -0.341*** -0.20*** -0.091 -0.331*** -0.22*** 0.184 -0.053 -0.023 0.413 
 
(0.066) (0.075) (0.576) (0.062) (0.071) (0.616) (0.065) (0.079) (0.818) 
          Observations 8,501 7697 8,501 7,912 7145 7,912 2,611 2366 2,611 
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.103 0.0994 0.103 0.0885 0.0864 0.0885 0.0435 0.0397 0.0435 
R-squared 0.043 0.048 0.048 0.050 0.055 0.059 0.026 0.027 0.034 
Number of hhidpn 1,389      1,384 
 
  571 
 
  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Transition Matrix where T is first observation with caregiving parent / parent-in-
law  (n=723) 
Time T-1 / Time T  Working full-time Working part-time Not working 
Working full-time Number 194 30 45 
(n=269) (percent of row) (0.72) (0.11) (0.17) 
 Change in hrs -1.87 -15.18 -41.09 
 
Change in 
earnings 3522 1438 -34122 
Working part-time Number 22 79 47 
(n=148) (percent of row) (0.15) (0.53) (0.32) 
 Change in hrs 9.17 -1.61 -20.87 
 
Change in 
earnings 2072 1106 -14735 
Not working  Number 9 25 272 
(n=306) (percent of row) (0.03) (0.08) (0.89) 
 Change in hrs 46.88 16.84 0.00 
 
Change in 
earnings 4919 6853 0 
Table 5b. Transition Matrix where there is no caregiving between T-1 and T  (n=13,411) 
 
Time T-1 / Time T Working full-time 
Working part-
time Not working 
Working full-time Number 2809 453 537 
(n=3,930) (percent of row) (0.74) (0.12) (0.14) 
 Change in hrs -0.03 -15.42 -42.15 
 Change in earnings 1136 -5807 -33754 
Working part-time Number 337 1360 540 
(n=2,446) (percent of row) (0.15) (0.61) (0.24) 
 Change in hrs 14.27 -0.64 -18.95 
 Change in earnings 1547 -1221 -11956 
Not working  Number 149 359 5404 
(n=7,035) (percent of row) (0.03) (0.06) (0.91) 
 Change in hrs 42.46 17.60 0.00 
 Change in earnings 16718 5792 0 
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Table 6a.  The Effect of Caregiving on Work 
 Work (0/1) Hours worked Hours worked | working 
 
OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
Care Giving (0/1) -0.046** -0.061*** -0.029* -1.669** -1.90** -1.712*** -0.164 0.31 -1.290** 
 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.016) (0.803) (0.88) (0.653) (0.758) (0.85) (0.592) 
Age -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.004 -1.161*** -1.08*** -0.213 -0.577*** -0.47*** 0.017 
 
(0.002) (0.0021) (0.012) (0.078) (0.091) (0.494) (0.075) (0.093) (0.423) 












































































































 Married (0/1) -0.061*** -0.069*** -0.131*** -2.920*** -3.22*** -4.339*** -1.294* -1.58* -1.562 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.830) (0.91) (1.153) (0.774) (0.86) (1.058) 
#children -0.001 -0.0030 -0.002 -0.021 -0.041 -0.013 0.058 0.089 0.232 
 
(0.005) (0.0051) (0.010) (0.193) (0.20) (0.437) (0.169) (0.18) (0.294) 
Preliminary and incomplete. Please do not cite without permission from the authors.
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Fair/Poor Health  -0.272*** -0.26*** -0.097*** -9.463*** -9.14*** -2.965*** -0.280 -0.12 -0.045 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.844) (0.90) (0.767) (0.823) (0.87) (0.670) 
2nd wealth quartile 0.024 0.024 -0.006 1.453* 1.31 0.106 0.658 0.56 0.597 
 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.018) (0.840) (0.92) (0.773) (0.686) (0.79) (0.540) 
3rd wealth quartile 0.005 0.019 -0.011 -0.151 0.17 -0.750 -0.551 -0.67 0.059 
 
(0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.983) (1.08) (0.964) (0.827) (0.95) (0.710) 
4th wealth quartile -0.070*** -0.058** -0.070*** -3.897*** -3.45*** -2.762** -2.436** -2.24* -0.301 
 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (1.138) (1.23) (1.207) (1.065) (1.15) (0.946) 
Constant 1.839*** 1.83*** 1.115* 78.858*** 74.4*** 44.160* 61.135*** 56.0*** 36.656* 
 
(0.104) (0.12) (0.632) (4.443) (5.24) (25.330) (4.178) (5.22) (21.477) 
          Observations 8,658 7,824 8,658 8,602 7,775 8,602 5,375 4,807 5,375 
Mean of Dependent 
Variables 0.579 0.621 0.579 20.18 21.76 20.18 35.02 35.19 35.02 
R-squared 0.195 0.196 0.151 0.216 0.214 0.171 0.078 0.082 0.060 
Number of hhidpn  1,398 1,398 1,197 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Preliminary and incomplete. Please do not cite without permission from the authors.
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Table 6b.  The Effect of Caregiving on Work 
Dependent Variables Annual Earnings Annual Earnings if working 
 
OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
      Care Giving (0/1) -0.90 -1.23 -1.26 1.07 1.28 -0.27 
 
(1.02) (1.03) (0.90) (1.45) (1.44) (1.33) 
Age -1.37*** -0.99*** -0.12 -1.24*** -0.60*** -1.12 
 
(0.15) (0.13) (1.35) (0.19) (0.17) (2.14) 








































































 Married (0/1) -6.34*** -5.36*** -4.07*** -5.47*** -4.14*** -2.34 
 
(1.20) (1.16) (1.43) (1.52) (1.44) (1.99) 
#children -0.17 -0.19 -0.83 -0.24 -0.39 -1.41 
 
(0.27) (0.25) (1.01) (0.34) (0.33) (1.57) 
Fair/Poor Health (0/1) -7.41*** -6.98*** -1.13* -3.54*** -2.94** 0.48 
 
(0.93) (0.94) (0.68) (1.31) (1.34) (0.95) 
2nd wealth quantile 2.90*** 1.11 -0.61 2.55** 0.78 -1.17 
 
(1.00) (1.04) (1.51) (1.28) (1.35) (2.37) 
3rd wealth quantile 3.80*** 1.72 -0.70 4.38*** 1.72 -0.50 
 
(1.22) (1.32) (2.46) (1.55) (1.65) (3.88) 
4th wealth quantile 2.07 0.085 -2.92 5.28* 2.70 -1.62 
 
(1.95) (1.73) (2.79) (2.86) (2.45) (4.35) 
Constant 81.24*** 59.4*** 39.64 75.75*** 42.2*** 96.08 
 
(8.24) (7.37) (67.42) (10.79) (9.57) (106.09) 
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Observations 8,658 7,824 8,658 5,431 4856 5,431 
Mean of Dependent 
Variables 18.94 20.29 18.94 30.18 30.10 30.18 
R-squared 0.17 0.207 0.05 0.15 0.208 0.01 
Number of hhidpn 1,398   1,198 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Preliminary and incomplete. Please do not cite without permission from the authors.
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Age 52.37 70.57 18.2 18 51.92 70.07 18.15 18 
Spouse/Partner Age 56.24 73.3 17.84 18 55.31 73.03 18.10* 18 
Married 0.77 0.57 -0.21 0 0.79 0.6 -0.19 0 
Fair/Poor Health 0.14 0.24 0.11 0 0.12 0.23 0.12 0 
Net Wealth 344,399 507,849 163,450 38,092 360,242 493,518 133,276 42,488 
Household Income 78,304 56,583 -21,721 -17,525 83,847 59,021 -24,826 -22,480 
Earnings | > 0 30,720 34,521 -18,499 -18,535 34,030 22,914 -26080* -23,169 
Work 0/1 0.67 0.23 -0.44 0 0.71 0.24 -0.47 -1 
Work Full-time 0.47 0.1 -0.37 0 0.51 0.08 -0.44** 0 
Work Part-time 0.2 0.13 -0.07 0 0.2 0.17 -0.03 0 
Hours Worked | Working 35.83 27.28 -10.67 -10 37.27 27.5 -11.79 -10 
Any Parents, In-laws 1 0.21 -0.79 -1 1 0.2 -0.8 -1 
Any Parents 1 0.19 -0.81 -1 1 0.17 -0.83 -1 
Any Parents-in-law 0.34 0.03 -0.31 0 0.45 0.05 -0.41*** 0 
Preliminary and incomplete. Please do not cite without permission from the authors.
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Table 8.  The Long-term Effect of Caregiving on Work in 2010 
Dependent Variables Any Work Annual Earnings Annual Earnings if working 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Work 1992 (0/1) 0.057** 0.058** 3.77** 4.06** 18.23** 19.3** 
 
(0.028) (0.029) (1.47) (1.66) (8.20) (9.36) 
Annual Earnings 1992 0.000* 0.00095 0.01 -0.025 -0.06 -0.16 
 
(0.000) (0.00064) (0.06) (0.065) (0.14) (0.15) 
Ever Care Giving (0/1) -0.025 -0.024 -4.57*** -4.61*** -12.47** -11.5** 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (1.63) (1.63) (5.17) (4.98) 
Age 1992 -0.023*** -0.022*** -1.41*** -1.33*** -2.67*** -2.53* 
 
(0.003) (0.0029) (0.37) (0.43) (1.02) (1.31) 
High school 1992 -0.012 -0.027 0.51 0.30 1.33 2.20 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (1.08) (1.01) (4.29) (4.02) 
Some college 1992 -0.001 0.0017 4.17*** 3.83*** 12.42*** 12.2*** 
 
(0.041) (0.042) (1.39) (1.38) (4.51) (4.71) 
College+ 1992 0.001 0.00038 8.11** 8.02** 19.58* 18.9* 
 
(0.046) (0.047) (3.89) (3.33) (10.82) (9.78) 
Experience 1992 0.006*** 0.0042*** 0.12** 0.051 -0.00 0.14 
 
(0.001) (0.0015) (0.06) (0.061) (0.22) (0.27) 
Tenure longest job  -0.001 -0.0017 -0.10 -0.17** -0.20 -0.37 
 
(0.002) (0.0018) (0.08) (0.079) (0.35) (0.31) 






















Nonwhite (0/1) 0.014 0.011 7.87 8.42 26.81 29.6 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (5.07) (5.33) (17.65) (20.0) 
Hispanic (0/1) -0.083* -0.086** -2.59* -1.95 -11.66* -9.40 
 
(0.044) (0.041) (1.43) (1.37) (6.16) (6.23) 
Married 1992 (0/1) -0.008 -0.017 -0.89 -0.75 -4.60 -1.33 
 
(0.030) (0.031) (1.23) (1.26) (4.49) (4.11) 
#children 1992 0.012** 0.011* 0.32 0.096 0.33 -0.086 
 
(0.006) (0.0064) (0.32) (0.27) (0.93) (0.87) 
Fair/Poor Health  -0.132*** -0.13*** -3.94*** -3.17*** -5.28 -7.08 
 
(0.032) (0.031) (1.03) (0.94) (5.62) (6.11) 
2nd wealth quartile  -0.020 0.015 0.83 1.88 0.81 0.82 
 
(0.033) (0.035) (1.61) (1.95) (4.62) (5.21) 
3rd wealth quartile  -0.016 0.012 4.46 4.64 13.07 11.1 
 
(0.037) (0.039) (3.88) (3.99) (11.48) (10.9) 
4th wealth quartile  -0.020 0.024 -0.28 0.74 4.85 2.97 
 
(0.041) (0.044) (2.52) (2.76) (9.02) (8.19) 
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Constant 1.294*** 1.22*** 72.88*** 67.6*** 138.70*** 123.6** 
 
(0.148) (0.16) (17.96) (21.2) (46.72) (60.0) 
Observations 1,315 1,283 1,315 1,283 339 320 
Mean of Dependent 
Variables 0.238 0.249 6.884 7.027 24.30 23.27 
R-squared 0.107 0.103 0.099 0.106 0.159 0.175 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Preliminary and incomplete. Please do not cite without permission from the authors.
